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Technical Default, Auditors' Decisions
and Future Financial Distress
Michael S. Wilkins
Michael S. Wilkins is Assistant Professor at Texas A&M University.
SYNOPSIS: The purpose of this paper is to document auditors' responses to first-time debt covenant
vioiations and to determine whether these responses can be used to predict financiai distress. The
data reveai, consistent with SFAS No. 78, that auditors are more iikely to require debt rec las sifi cation
when the violations are not waived by lenders. In contrast, the waiver decision does not appear to
significantly influence the auditor's qualification decision. The empiricai tests also show that for firms
experiencing technical defauit, the audit opinion is an important determinant of future financial distress, even after controlling for factors typically associated with bankruptcy.
Data Availability: Data that are used in this study are available from public sources.

INTRODUCTION
Positive accounting theory assumes that
debt covenant violation is costly and, as a result, that managers prefer to avoid incidents
of technical default (Watts and Zimmerman
1986).^ Based on this premise, accounting researchers have expended considerable effort determining the types of firms that are most
likely to encounter default (Press and Weintrop
1990) and the costs that are associated with
default (Beneish and Press 1993). More recently, studies have evaluated how a variety
of parties—managers (Defond and Jiambalvo
1994; Sweeney 1994), lenders (Chen and Wei
1993) and investors (Beneish and Press 1995a,
1995b)—respond to incidents of technical
default. By documenting the differential
reactions that occur across different users,
these studies have significantly enhanced our
understanding of debt covenant effects.
The present paper complements this line
of research by examining auditors' responses
to debt covenant violations. The first part of
the study investigates the determinants of auditors' debt reclassification and qualification
decisions, while the second seeks to determine,
conditional on technical default, whether the
actions taken by auditors can be used to pre-

dict future financial distress. The results indicate that when firms encounter technical default, auditors' actions are infiuenced in part
by the actions of lenders. Specifically, auditors
use both financial statement data and waiver
decisions in determining the appropriate
course of action when their clients experience
technical default. Empirical tests also reveal
that defaulting firms that receive qualified
audit opinions face an increased likelihood of
financial distress in subsequent periods. These
findings contribute to the literature by documenting how auditors respond to technical
' Throughout this paper the terms "covenant violation,"
"covenant default," and "default" are nsed synonymously to refer to technical violations of accountingbased or other debt covenants. Technical defaxilt differs from debt service default, which involves missed
principal or interest payments.
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default and by demonstrating that auditors'
decisions can be used to evaluate the situations likely to be faced by violating firms in
subsequent periods.
The remainder of the paper is structured
as follows. In section two, background information regarding technical default and auditors' decisions is provided. In section three, the
data collection procedures are explained and
summary data are presented. Section four presents the empirical analysis, and a summary
is provided in section five.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This section describes the context within
which the two types of auditor decisions (qualification and debt reclassification) are made.
The general authority regarding debt reclassification comes from SFAS No. 78,Classiflcation of Obligations that are Callable by the
Creditor. According to SFAS No. 78, the shortterm classification is intended to include obligations that are callable either (1) because the
act of default triggers the lender's right to accelerate the debt, or (2) because thefirm'sfailure to cure the violation within a specified
grace period will make the debt callable. Under either of these conditions, the debt should
be classified as current unless a waiver is received or, assuming a grace period exists, if it
is likely that the violation will be cured within
the grace period {FASB 1983).
Even if waivers are received, however,
firms may be required to reclassify the debt as
short-term. According to FASB 1986, Classification of Obligations when a Violation is
Waiued by the Creditor, the debt may require
current classification if "(a) a covenant violation has occurred at the balance sheet date or
would have occurred absent a loan modification and (b) it is probable that the borrower
will not be able to cure the default (comply
with the covenant) at measurement dates that
are within the next 12 months." Therefore,
auditors must exercise some judgment regardless of whether lenders have granted waivers
at the balance sheet date. Given the provisions
of SFAS No. 78, however, firms failing to receive waivers would seem to be more likely
candidates for reclassification.
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A related issue involves the interaction
between the reclassification decision and the
audit opinion. Specifically, does the act of reclassification require or suggest that a qualified opinion will be issued? There is little doubt
that the two decisions are related; ceterisparibus, firms experiencing debt reclassification
are more likely to face accelerated repayment
and the corresponding liquidity difficulties. As
a result, such firms also are more likely to be
classified as going concern problems. However,
under Statement on Auditing Standards No.
58, reclassification in and of itself does not
warrant a change in the auditor's standard unqualified report. In fact, the coiTelation between reclassification and qualification likely
was stronger before AICPA 1988, when qualifications could be granted "subject-to" the effects of a variety of material uncertainties. For
example, in this study, which is comprised entirely of pre-SAS No. 58 opinions, 67 percent
of the firms having their debt reclassified to
short-term received qualified opinions, while
only 39 percent were issued going concern
qualifications. In essence, although the qualification decision certainly is not independent
of the reclassification decision, the existence
of one does not necessarily imply the presence
of the other.

SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Data Collection
The sample used in this study consists of
159 firms traded on the NYSE/AMEX or
NASDAQ, and having initial default dates
rangingfi-om1978 to 1988.^ To collect data regarding the covenant violations, annual report
or Form 10-K filings were examined for each
samplefirmfrom year -2 through year +2 relative to the initially identified year of default
(i.e., a minimum offiveyears). This procedure
was utilized to determine whether covenants
^ The sample of firms used in this study comes from
three sources: (1) firms used hy Chen and Wei (1993);
(2) firms used by Beneish and Press (1993); and (3)
firms identified using a search of the LEXIS network
for the years 1984-1986. Chen and Wei (1993) used
Compact Disclosure to identify firms in violation during the years 1985-1988, and Beneish and Press (1993)
searched Compact Disclosure, NAARS and the Dow
Jones News Service for the years 1983-1987. Many
firms were common across two or more of the sample
sources and these duplicate firms were included only
once.

42

Accounting Horizons /December 1997

had been violated prior to the initially-identified event years and whetherfirmsremained
in violation after the initially identified event
years. If a violation was found in year -2 or 1, financial statements were examined prior
to these years until two consecutive years of
compliance were discovered. For example, if a
firm had been identified as having an initial
covenant violation in 1986, but was discovered
to have a previous violation in 1984, the initial violation year was redefined as 1984 and
years -1 and -2 were redefined as 1983 and
1982. Financial statements in the post-violation period were examined until two consecutive years of compliance were discovered.
Therefore, if a firm had an initial violation in
1984 and had additional violations in 1986 and
1987, data were collectedfi-om1982 (year -2)
through 1989 (two years of compliance after
the final violation in 1987).
Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for the complete sample
of firms are presented in table 1. In panel A,
median values are summarized as of the end
of the fiscal year prior to the initial covenant
violation (year -1), the end of thefiscalyear of
the initial covenant violation (year 0), and the
end of the fiscal year subsequent to the initial
covenant violation (year+1). Table 1 illustrates
that violating firms experienced increasing
debt levels and decreasing equity values across
the three-year period. Table 1 also shows that
covenant violations are associated with decreased liquidity and decreased profitability.^
Panel B reveals the same trends that are documented by Beneish and Press (1993), namely
that firms facing violation have significantly
lower equity values, profitability levels and liquidity levels, and significantly higher debt
levels than do their industry counterparts. In
total, the summary data suggest that incidents
of default are likely to be associated with firms
that are experiencing deteriorating financial
health.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Univariate Tests
Auditor Decisions vs. Lender Decisions
This section of the paper presents a series
of 2 X 2 contingency tables which examine the

association between auditors' and lenders' responses to initial debt covenant violations. In
these tables, the response of the auditor is assumed to be the dependent effect. Based on the
development in section two, auditors should
be more likely to require that the violated debt
be reclassified to short-term if waivers are not
granted. Similarly, it is expected that firms
failing to receive waivers will be more likely
to receive qualified audit opinions.
The results of the initial tests are presented
in table 2. The data support a significant relation between the waiver partition and the
auditor's debt reclassification decision. Only
17 percent (15 of 89) of the firms receiving
waivers had their debt reclassified to shortterm, while 49 percent (34 of 70) of the firms
failing to receive waivers were subject to reclassification. These results are consistent with
auditors using lenders' decisions to proxy for
the likelihood that debt repayment will be accelerated into the current year. Table 2 also
illustrates, however, that auditors exercise a
fair amount ofjudgment when waivers are not
granted. Specifically, auditorsfor over half (36
of 70) of the firms failing to receive default
waivers apparently estimated that the violations would be cured within the grace period
and, accordingly, retained the debt's long-term
classification. Thisfindingcounters one of the
concerns expressed in comment letters deahng
with SFAS No. 78, that the standard "substantially removes any auditor judgment in evaluating how an obligation should be classified when
a violation exists." (SFAS No. 78, para. 16)
The results for the auditor's qualification
decision are comparable to the findings for the
reclassification decision. Of the 70 firms failing to receive waivers, 56 percent were issued
qualified opinions. In contrast, only 30 percent
of the 89 firms receiving waivers had their
audit opinions qualified. Similar associations
exist when qualifications are restricted to those
citing going concern problems. Roughly twothirds of the going concern opinions were issued to firms that failed to have their initial
violations waived. In total, the data involving
^ Year-to-year changes in each of the four summary
measures are significant at, at least, the ten percent
level (two-tailed).
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TABLE 1
Median and Mean Values for Selected Financial Measures
for the Sample of 159 Firms Experiencing First-Time Debt Covenant Violations
Panel A: Median Values Over Time

Panel B: Comparison to Industry Mean in Year 0
Firm
Variable
Mean
0.73
Debt/Assets
1.37
Current Ratio
-25.65
Earnings
Equity Value
105.61

Industry
Mean
0.64
3.07
10.34
306.89

tStatistic
4.27**
11.33**
4.60**
3.96**

** denotes significance at p < = 0.05.
Data are from the 1995 Compustat tapes.
Debt/Assets = Total Liabilities (Item No. 181)yTotal Assets (Item No. 6)
Current Ratio = Current Assets (Item No. 4)/Current Liabilities (Item No. 5)
Earnings = Earnings Before Extraordinary Items (Item No. 18)
Equity Value = Common Shares (Item No. 25) *Common Share Price (Item No. 199)

the waiver partition reveal that auditors incorporate lenders' decisions when they evaluate
firms that are in violation of their debt covenants.
Because over half of the firms failing to receive
waivers were not subject to reciassification, however, auditors do appear to exercise quite a bit of
judgment in determining the financial statement
presentation of violated debt.

Subsequent Period Problems
The second set of univariate tests, presented in table 3, examines the association between lenders' and auditors' decisions at the
date of initial default and financial distress
encountered by violating firms in subsequent
periods. In this framework, financial distress
is defined as either bankruptcy or debt service
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TABLE 2
Association Between Auditors' and Lenders* Responses
to Initial Debt Covenant Violations
Partition
No Waiver
Waiver

Debt Not
Reclassified

Debt
Reclassified

36

34
15

74

X' = 18.49**
Partition
No Waiver
Waiver

Opinion Not
Qualified

Opinion
Qualified

31
62

39
27

X' = 10.39**

Partition
No Waiver
Waiver

No Going Concern
Opinion

Going Concern
Opinion

50

20

78

11

= 6.56**

** denotes significance at p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
default, which often leads to bankruptcy.* The
general hypothesis is that firms that fail to
receive waivers, that have their debt reclassified to short-term, and that receive qualified
opinions will be more likely to face financial
distress in future periods.
Table 3 illustrates that lenders' initial
waiver decisions are not significant determinants of future distress and that auditors' initial debt reclassification decisions are only
marginally significant (p = 0.08). Specifically,
39 percent (19 of 49) of the reclassification firms
encountered financial distress in subsequent
periods, compared to only 25 percent (28 of 110)
of firms not experiencing debt reclassification.
The qualification decision, however, exhibits
a highly significant association with future financial distress. Almost half (31 of 66) of the
firms receiving qualified audit opinions eventually experienced debt service default or filed
for bankruptcy. In contrast, only 17 percent
(16 of 93) of the firms that were Issued clean
opinions ultimately encountered financial dis-

tress. Stated differently, firms receiving qualified opinions account for 66 percent of the incidents of future debt service default or bankruptcy even though they make up a minority
of the sample observations. Similar to the previous section, the results are comparable when
the qualification partition encompasses only
going concern opinions. In sum, the data presented in table 3 suggest that the initial decisions of auditors, particularly decisions involving the audit opinion, can be used to assess
the likelihood that firms will encounter future
financial difficulties.

MULTIVARIATE TESTS
Table 4 presents three LOGIT models that
re-examine the previously discussed associations in a multivariate setting. Given the similar findings for general qualifications and for
going concern opinions noted throughout this
^ The empirical results are qualitatively unchanged
under a more restrictive definition which confines
financial distress to subsequent bankruptcy filings.
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TABLE 3

Partition

Relationship Between Auditors* and Lenders' Responses
and Future Financial Distress
No Future Debt
Future Debt
Service Default or
Service Default
Bankruptcy
or Bankruptcy

No Waiver
Waiver

45
67

25
22

X' = 2.28

Partition
Debt Not Reclassified
Debt Reclassified

No Future Debt
Service Default or
Bankruptcy

Future Debt
Service Default
or Bankruptcy

82
30

28
19

X' = 2.89*

Partition
Opinion Not Qualified
Opinion Qualified

No Future Debt
Service Default or
Bankruptcy

Future Debt
Service Default
or Bankruptcy

77
35

16
31

= 16.43**

Partition
No Going Concern Opinion
Going Concern Opinion

No Future Debt
Service Default or
Bankruptcy

Future Debt
Service Default
or Bankruptcy

96
16
yz = 6.56**

32
15

** and * denote significance at p < 0.05 and p < 0.10, respectively (two-tailed).

paper, separate models for firms receiving going concern opinions are not presented.^ The
first two panels of table 4 build from the
univariate analysis presented in table 2, and involve the following specifications (expected signs
are shown below the variable designations):
RECLASS = ttj -i-YjWAIVER
(-)
+ Y QUALIFY + Y3LEVERAGE
(+)
(+)
+ Y4ROA.
(1)

QUALIFY = ttj

-I- Y4ROA + Y5CURRENT.

(2)

As with the univariate tests, models defining "qualification" as "going concern qualification" are very
similar to models utilizing a broader definition of
"qualification." The similarity is probably attributable
to the fact that qualifications issued prior to SAS No.
58 often highlighted material uncertainties such as
financing difficulties which were not initially significant enough to warrant a going concern opinion.
These "subject-to" qualifications, however, may have
(Continued on next page)
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Table 4
LOGIT Regressions Involving Initial Auditor Decisions and Future Financial Distress
Panel A: Debt Reclassification Decision
RECLASS = a^ + y, WAIVER + y^QUALIFY + ygLEVERAGE + y^ROA
CL

Coefficient estimate
t-statistic

V
'1

1

-2.00
-1.90*

V
'2

-1.44
-3.06**

1.24
2.76**

V
'3

V
h

1.88
1.29

0.08
0.06

Panel B: Audit Opinion
QUALIFY = a, + y^WAIVER + y^RECLASS + Y3LEVERAGE + y^ROA + y^CURRENT
Coefficient estimate
t-statistic

a.
-0.82
-0.60

-0.13
-0.27

0.92
2.00**

1.41
0.94

-5.05
-3.30**

-1.13
-2.76**

Panel C: Future Financial Distress
DISTRESS = ttj + y^WAIVER + y^ RECLASS + ygQUALIFY + y^LEVERAGE + y^ROA +y,
+y,CURRENT
T2

Coefficient estimate -3.90
t-statistic
-2.60**

-0.34
-0.74

0.09
0.19

73

1.14
2.43**

74

4.04
2.45**

75

2.60
1.62

-0.04
-0.11

** and * denote significance at p < 0.05 and p < 0.10, respectively (two-tailed).
DISTRESS = future distress; 0 = none or technical default, 1 = debt service default or bankruptcy,
WAIVER = 1 if initial violations were explicitly waived, 0 otherwise,
RECLASS = 1 if auditors initially reclassified violated debt to short-term, 0 otherwise,
QUALIFY = 1 if initial audit opinion was qualified, 0 othervdse,
LEVERAGE = total liabilities/total assets (Compustat Item No. 181/Item No. 6),
ROA = earnings before extraordinary items/total assets (Compustat Item No. 18 /Item No. 6),
CURRENT = current assets/current liabilities (Compustat Item No. 4 / Item No. 5).
In models (1) and (2), LEVERAGE is defined as total liabilities divided by total assets,
CURRENT is defined as current assets divided
by current liabilities, and ROA is defined as earnings before extraordinary items divided by total
assets. These three variables—representing financial leverage, liquidity and profitability, respectively—are continuous and are included
to control for the basic financial statement effects likely to be incorporated in both the reclassification and qualification decision.^ All
other variables take the value of one when the
characteristic is present, and zero when the
characteristic is not present. Because the two
auditor decisions are not completely dependent, the qualification variable is included in
the reclassification model, and vice versa.''
Panel A of table 4 presents evidence fi'om
the debt reclassification model. The significant

negative coefficient for WAIVER reveals that
firms receiving waivers are less likely to have
Footnote 5 (Continued)
provided the first indication of potential going concern problems and/or financial distress.
^ If CURRENT is included in the reclassification regression, the coefficient is significant and of the appropriate sign (negative). However, it is difficult to
determine whether reclassification is genuinely more
likely when firms are having liquidity problems, or
whether the significant negative estimate exists because reclassification mechanically produces lower
current ratios. As a result, CURRENT is not included
in the formal presentation of model (1).
' Altbough it is likely that the qualification decision is
more dependent on the reclassification decision than
the reverse, generalizing this relationship is difficult.
An additional, and perhaps more likely, possibility is
that both decisions are dependent on a subset of the
auditor's private information regarding the firm,
which is acting as a correlated omitted variable in
panels A and B.
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their debt reclassified to short-term, a result
which is consistent with the development presented in section two. The significant positive
estimate for QUALIFY suggests that firms receiving qualified opinions are more likely to
have their debt reclassified. This association
supports the notion that some interaction exists between the auditor's reclassification decision and the audit opinion. Neither of the
control variables is significant at conventional
levels. In total, the conclusions that can be
drawn from panel A are comparable to those
generated by the univariate tests shown in table 2.
Specifically, auditors rely, at least to some extent,
on lenders' decisions in evaluating whether the
debt should be reclassified as current.
In contrast to the findings regarding the
debt reclassification decision, panel B of table
4 illustrates that decisions regarding the audit opinion are largely dependent on financial
data. The significant negative estimates for
both CURRENT and ROA reveal that firms
experiencing low liquidity and profitability levels are more likely to receive qualified opinions. The coefficient estimate for RECLASS is
significant as well, confirming the positive association between the two auditor decisions
that is documented in panel A. After controlling for the reclassification decision and financial statement effects, however, the lender's
waiver decision does not contribute significantly to the qualification model.^ Thus, although a firm's failure to receive default waivers is an important determinant of the balance
sheet presentation of the violated debt, measures offinancialhealth appear to be used more
consistently in the development of the audit
opinion.^
Panel C of table 4 presents thefinalLOGIT
specification, which evaluates the importance
of auditors' decisions in predicting future financial distress. The specification tested in
panel C is as follows:
DISTRESS = ttj+
+ y RECLASS + Y3QUALIFY
(+)
• (+)
+ Y LEVERAGE + Y5ROA

()
Y.CURRENT

()
(3)
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where DISTRESS is equal to 1 if the firm experienced either debt service default or bankruptcy in future periods, and is equal to 0 for
all other cases. All other variables are as previously defined.
Panel C of table 4 illustrates that neither
the lender's waiver decision nor the auditor's
debt reclassification decision is important in
predicting future financial distress. Similarly,
although liquidity and profitability were found
to influence the auditor's qualification decision,
neither measure is significantly associated
with subsequent distress. The significance of
LEVERAGE, however, indicates that firms
having high levels of debt at the date of initial
default are more likely to encounter bankruptcy in future periods. The auditor's qualification decision is also found to be an important predictor of finandal distress. Specifically,
the significance of the qualification decision
reveals that, given a debt covenant violation,
firms receiving qualified opinions have a
greater likelihood of experiencing severe financial problems in subsequent periods. Most importantly, this result holds even after controlling for financial statement effects typically
associated with an increased probability of
bankruptcy.
I
SUMMARY
The most recent trend in debt covenant research has been to evaluate how different users respond to incidents of technical default.
Although studies have examined the responses
of managers, investors and creditors, little
emphasis has been placed on auditors' reactions to debt covenant violations. The evidence
presented in this paper suggests, consistent
with SFAS No. 78, that auditors are more
likely to require that obligations be reclassified as current when the corresponding violations are not waived. The results also indicate
8 If RECLASS is omitted from model (2), WAIVER becomes significant. Given the lack of significance in
the complete model, however, it is likely t h a t
WAIVER simply proxies for RECLASS in the reduced
model.
^ The pairwise correlations hetween the independent
effects in all of the models are relatively high. Collinearity diagnostics, however, do not suggest that
the integrity of the models is materially affected.
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that, conditional on technical default, the
auditor's initial qualification decision is a significant predictor of financial distress, even
though such distress may not occur for several
years in the future. The latter finding, in
particular, offers additional support for
Nogler's (1995) defense of the integrity of the
audit opinion.
Because the sample used in this study includes pre-SAS No. 58 qualifications, additional

research in this area should examine the relation between covenant violations and opinions
that are guided by SAS No. 58. Such an analysis would facilitate comparisons between "subject-to" opinions and the explanatory paragraphs that are now used in practice. Researchers may also want to incorporate the opinions
of practitioners, gathered via survey or experimental methods, in extending the models presented in this paper.
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